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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220923T120000
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UID:7351-1663934400-1663938000@seasevents.nmsdev7.com
SUMMARY:Theory Seminar- Recent Developments in Combinatorial Auctions\, Matt Weinberg (Princeton University)
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: In a combinatorial auction there are m items\, and each of n players has a valuation function v_i which maps sets of items to non-negative reals. A designer wishes to partition the items into S_1\,…\,S_n to maximize the welfare (\sum_i v_i(S_i) )\, perhaps assuming that all v_i lie in some class V (such as submodular\, subadditive\, etc.). \nWithin Algorithmic Game Theory\, this problem serves as a lens through which to examine the interplay between computation and incentives. For example: is it the case that whenever a poly-time/poly-communication algorithm for honest players can achieve an approximation guarantee of c when all valuations lie in V\, a poly-time/poly-communication truthful mechanism for strategic players can achieve an approximation guarantee of c when all valuations lie in V as well? \nIn this talk\, I’ll give a brief history\, then survey three recent results on this topic which: \n– provide the first separation between achievable guarantees of poly-communication algorithms and poly-communication truthful mechanisms for any V (joint works with Mark Braverman and Jieming Mao\, and with Sepehr Assadi\, Hrishikesh Khandeparkar\, and Raghuvansh Saxena). \n– revisit existing separations between poly-time algorithms and poly-time truthful mechanisms via a new solution concept “Implementation in Advised Strategies” (joint work with Linda Cai and Clayton Thomas). \n– resolve the communication complexity of combinatorial auctions for two subadditive players (joint work with Tomer Ezra\, Michal Feldman\, Eric Neyman\, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen\, time-permitting).
URL:https://seasevents.nmsdev7.com/event/theory-seminar-recent-developments-in-combinatorial-auctions-matt-weinberg-princeton-university/
LOCATION:Room 401B\, 3401 Walnut\, 3401 Walnut Street\, Philadelphia\, PA\, 19104\, United States
CATEGORIES:Seminar
ORGANIZER;CN="The Warren Center":MAILTO:Lhoot@seas.upenn.edu
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