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SUMMARY:CIS Seminar: "Foundations of Cryptographic Proof Systems"
DESCRIPTION:One of computer science’s greatest insights has been in understanding the power and versatility of *proofs*\, which were revolutionized in the 1980s to utilize *interaction* as well as other resources such as randomization and computational hardness. Today\, they form the backbone of both theoretical and practical cryptography and are simultaneously the source of deep connections to areas such as complexity theory\, game theory\, and quantum computation. \nIn this talk\, I will introduce general-purpose tools\, techniques\, and abstractions for two key aspects of cryptographic proof systems that have been poorly understood for decades: \n1) Can we remove interaction from interactive proofs? Already in the 1980s\, Fiat and Shamir proposed a heuristic *but unproven* methodology for removing interaction from interactive proofs\, which is now ubiquitous and essential for practical applications. However\, it remained open for over 30 years to prove the security of this transformation in essentially any setting of interest. \nMy work on the Fiat-Shamir transform has led to resolutions to many long-standing open problems\, including (i) building non-interactive zero knowledge proof systems based on lattice cryptography\, (ii) establishing the existence of highly efficient and succinct non-interactive proof systems\, and (iii) demonstrating that foundational protocols from the 80s fail to compose in parallel. \n2) Are classical interactive protocols secure against quantum computers? At its heart\, the problem of analyzing and ruling out quantum attacks on cryptographic protocols is the issue of “rewinding.” The inability to rewind a quantum attack stems from the no-cloning theorem\, a fundamental property of quantum information. As a result\, very few classical protocols were known to be secure against quantum attacks. \nIn a recent work\, I showed how to overcome these difficulties and settle many foundational questions on post-quantum cryptographic proof systems. Our main technique is showing how to efficiently extract certain pieces of (classical) information from a quantum attacker without disturbing its internal state.
URL:https://seasevents.nmsdev7.com/event/cis-seminar-foundations-of-cryptographic-proof-systems/
LOCATION:Room 307\, Levine Hall\, 3330 Walnut Street\, Philadelphia\, PA\, 19104\, United States
ORGANIZER;CN="Computer and Information Science":MAILTO:cherylh@cis.upenn.edu
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